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Figure 1: Example gallery and probe face images (source: https://bit.ly/2LN7J50) and corresponding synthesized adversarial
examples. (a) Two celebrities’ real face photo enrolled in the gallery and (b) the same subject’s probe image; (c) Adversarial examples
generated from (b) by our proposed synthesis method, AdvFaces; (d-e) Results from two state-of-the-art adversarial example generation
methods. Cosine similarity scores (∈ [−1, 1]) obtained by comparing (b-e) to the enrolled image in the gallery via ArcFace [6] are shown
below the images. A score above 0.28 (threshold @ 0.1% False Accept Rate) indicates that two face images belong to the same subject.
Here, a successful obfuscation attack would mean that humans can identify the adversarial probes and enrolled faces as belonging to the
same identity but an automated face recognition system considers them to be from different subjects. The proposed AdvFaces automatically
learns to perturb those facial regions (set of pixels) that will evade an automated face recognition system, while the other baselines perturb
each pixel in the image.
Abstract
Face recognition systems have been shown to be vulner-
able to adversarial examples resulting from adding small
perturbations to probe images. Such adversarial images
can lead state-of-the-art face recognition systems to falsely
reject a genuine subject (obfuscation attack) or falsely
match to an impostor (impersonation attack). Current ap-
proaches to crafting adversarial face images lack percep-
tual quality and take an unreasonable amount of time to
generate them. We propose, AdvFaces, an automated ad-
versarial face synthesis method that learns to generate min-
imal perturbations in the salient facial regions via Gen-
erative Adversarial Networks. Once AdvFaces is trained,
it can automatically generate imperceptible perturbations
that can evade state-of-the-art face matchers with attack
success rates as high as 97.22% and 24.30% for obfusca-
tion and impersonation attacks, respectively.
1. Introduction
From mobile phone unlock, to boarding a flight at air-
ports, the ubiquity of automated face recognition systems
(AFR) is evident. With deep learning models, AFR sys-
tems are able to achieve accuracies as high as 99% True
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(a) Print attack (b) Replay attack (c) Mask attack
(d) Adversarial Faces synthesized via proposed AdvFaces
Figure 2: Three types of face presentation attacks: (a) printed pho-
tograph, (b) replaying the targeted person’s video on a smartphone,
and (c) a silicone mask of the target’s face. Face presentation at-
tacks require a physical artifact. Adversarial attacks (d), on the
other hand, are digital attacks that can compromise either a probe
image or the gallery itself. To a human observer, face presentation
attacks (a-c) are more conspicuous than adversarial faces (d).
Accept Rate (TAR) at 0.1% False Accept Rate (FAR) [15].
The model behind this success is a Convolutional Neural
Network (CNN) [31, 20, 6] and the availability of large
face datasets to train the model. However, CNN models
have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial pertur-
bations 1[36, 13, 24, 8]. Szegedy et al. first showed the
dangers of adversarial examples in the image classifica-
tion domain, where perturbing the pixels in the input image
can cause CNNs to misclassify the image [36] even when
the amount of perturbation is imperceptible to the human
eye. Despite impressive recognition performance, prevail-
ing AFR systems are still vulnerable to the growing threat
of adversarial examples (see Figure 1) as explained below.
A hacker can maliciously perturb his face image in a
manner that can cause AFR systems to match it to a tar-
get victim (impersonation attack) or any identity other than
the hacker (obfuscation attack). Yet to the human observer,
this adversarial face image should appear as a legitimate
face photo of the attacker (see Figure 4). This is different
from face presentation attacks, where the hacker assumes
the identity of a target by presenting a fake face (also known
as spoof face) to a face recognition system (see Figure 2).
However, in the case of presentation attacks, the hacker
needs to actively participate by wearing a mask or replaying
a photograph/video of the genuine individual which may
1Adversarial perturbations refer to altering an input image instance
with small, human imperceptible changes in a manner that can evade CNN
models.
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Figure 3: Eight points of attacks in an automated face recognition
system [29]. An adversarial image can be injected in the AFR
system at points 2 and 6 (solid arrows).
be conspicuous in scenarios where human operators are in-
volved (such as airports). As discussed below, adversarial
faces, do not require active participation during verification.
Consider for example, the United States Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), the largest federal law enforce-
ment agency in the United States [41], which (i) processes
entry to the country for over a million travellers every-
day [38] and (ii) employs automated face recognition for
verifying travelers’ identities [1]. In order to evade being
identified as an individual in a CBP watchlist, a terrorist can
maliciously enroll an adversarial image in the gallery such
that upon entering the border, his legitimate face image will
be matched to a known and benign individual or to a fake
identity previously enrolled in the gallery. An individual
can also generate adversarial examples to dodge his own
identity in order to guard personal privacy. Ratha et al. [29]
identified eight points in a biometric system where an attack
can be launched against a biometric (including face) recog-
nition system, including AFR (see Figure 3). An adversar-
ial face image can be inserted in the AFR system at point 2,
where compromised face embeddings will be obtained by
the feature extractor that could be used for impersonation
or obfuscation attacks. The entire gallery can also be com-
promised if the hacker enrolls an adversarial image at point
6, where none of the probes will match to the correct iden-
tity’s gallery.
Three broad categories of adversarial attacks have been
identified.
1. White-box attack: A majority of the prior work as-
sumes full knowledge of the CNN model and then it-
eratively adds imperceptible perturbations to the probe
image via various optimization schemes [13, 22, 4, 43,
10, 26, 19, 25, 5]. We posit that this is unrealistic in
real-world scenarios, since the attacker may not be able
to access the models.
2. Black-box attack: Generally, black-box attacks are
launched by querying the outputs of the deployed AFR
system [9], [21]. This may not be efficient as it may
take a large number of queries to obtain a reasonable
adversarial image [9]. Further, most Commercial-Off-
The-Shelf (COTS) face matchers permit only a few
queries at a time to prevent such attacks.
3. Semi-whitebox attack: Here, a white-box model is uti-
lized only during training and then adversarial ex-
amples are synthesized during inference without any
knowledge of the deployed AFR model.
Semi-whitebox settings are appropriate for crafting adver-
sarial faces; once the network learns to generate the per-
turbed instances based on a single face recognition system,
attacks can be transferred to any black-box AFR systems.
However, past approaches, based on Generative Adversar-
ial Networks (GANs) [42, 39, 35], were proposed in the
image classification domain and rely on softmax probabili-
ties [42, 39, 35, 34]. Therefore, the number of object classes
are assumed to be known during training and testing. In the
realm of face recognition, AFR systems do not utilize the
softmax layer for classification (as the number of identi-
ties are not fixed) instead features from the last fully con-
nected layer are used for comparing face images. Song
et al. proposed a GAN for generating adversarial exam-
ples specifically in the domain of face recognition, how-
ever, their method requires access to the face images en-
rolled in the gallery which may not be feasible in a real-
world setting [34]. Other approaches for adversarial faces
include adding makeup, eyeglasses, hat, or occlusions to
faces [14, 32, 33].
We emphasize the following requirements of the adver-
sarial face generator:
• The generated adversarial face images should be per-
ceptually realistic such that a human observer can
identify the image as a legitimate face image pertain-
ing to the target subject.
• The faces need to be perturbed in a manner such that
they cannot be identified as the hacker (obfuscation at-
tack) or automatically matched to a target subject (im-
personation attack) by an AFR system.
• The amount of perturbation should be controllable by
the hacker. This will allow the hacker to examine the
success of the learning model as a function of amount
of perturbation.
• The adversarial examples should be transferable and
model-agnostic (i.e. treat the target AFR model as a
black-box). In other words, the generated adversarial
examples should have high attack success rate on other
black-box AFR systems as well.
We propose an automated adversarial face synthesis
method, named AdvFaces, which generates an adversarial
mask for a probe face image and satisfies all the above re-
quirements. The adversarial mask can then be added to the
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Figure 4: Once trained, AdvFaces automatically generates an ad-
versarial face image. During an obfuscation attack, (a) the adver-
sarial face appears to be a benign example of Cristiano Ronaldo’s
face, however, it fails to match his enrolled image. AdvFaces can
also combine Cristiano’s probe and Brad Pitt’s probe to synthe-
size an adversarial image that looks like Cristiano but matches
Brad’s gallery image (b). Cosine similarity scores obtained from
ArcFace [6] (0.28 threshold @ 0.1% FAR). Source: https:
//bit.ly/2LN7J50
probe to obtain an adversarial face example that can be used
either for impersonating any target identity or obfuscating
one’s own identity (see Figure 4). The contributions of the
paper can be summarized as follows:
1. A GAN, AdvFaces, that learns to generate visually re-
alistic adversarial face images that are misclassified by
state-of-the-art AFR systems.
2. Adversarial faces generated via AdvFaces are model-
agnostic and transferable, and achieve high success
rate on 5 state-of-the-art automated face recognition
systems.
3. Visualizing the facial regions, where pixels are per-
turbed and analyzing the effect of varying image reso-
lution on the amount of perturbation.
4. An open-source2 automated adversarial face generator
permitting users to control the amount of perturbation.
2[link omitted for blind review]
2. Related Work
2.1. Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)
Generative Adversarial Networks [12] have success in
a wide variety of image synthesis applications [27, 7]
such as style transfer [37, 18, 11], image-to-image trans-
lation [17, 46], and representation learning [28, 30, 23].
Isola et al. showed that an image-to-image conditional GAN
can vastly improve the synthesis results [17]. In our work,
we adopt a similar adversarial loss and image-to-image net-
work architecture in order to learn a mapping from the in-
put face image to a perturbed output image such that the
perturbed image cannot be distinguished from real face im-
ages. However, different from prior work on GANs, our
objective is to synthesize face images that are not only vi-
sually realistic but are also able to evade AFR systems.
2.2. Adversarial Attacks on Image Classification
Majority of the published papers have focused on white-
box attacks, where the hacker has full access to the tar-
get classification model that is being attacked [36, 13, 4,
43, 22]. Given an image, Goodfellow et al. proposed the
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) which generates an ad-
versarial example by back-propagating through the target
model [13]. Madry et al. proposed Projected Gradient De-
scent (PGD), a multi-step variant of FGSM [22]. Other
works focused on optimizing adversarial perturbation by
minimizing an objective function for targeted attacks while
satisfying certain constraints [4]. However, these white-
box approaches are not feasible in the face recognition do-
main, as the attacker may not have any knowledge of the
deployed AFR system. In addition, the optimization pro-
cess can require multiple queries to the target system until
convergence. Instead, we propose a feed-forward network
that can automatically generate an adversarial image with a
single forward pass without the need for any knowledge of
AFR system during inference.
Indeed, feed-forward networks have been used for syn-
thesizing adversarial attacks. Baluja and Fischer proposed
a deep autoencoder that learns to transform an input im-
age to an adversarial image [2]. In their work, an L2 norm
loss is employed in order to constrain the generated adver-
sarial instance to be close to the original image in the L2
pixel space. In contrast, we apply a deep neural network as
a discriminator that distinguishes between real and synthe-
sized face images in order to maintain the perceptual quality
of the generated adversarial examples. Studies on synthe-
sizing adversarial instances via GANs are limited in litera-
ture [42, 39, 35]. These methods require softmax probabil-
ities in order to evade an image classifier. However, AFR
systems do not employ a softmax classification layer as the
number of classes (identities) is not fixed. Instead, we pro-
pose an identity loss function better suited for generating
adversarial faces using the face embeddings obtained from
a face matcher.
2.3. Adversarial Attacks on Face Recognition
In literature, studies on generating adversarial examples
in the face recognition domain are relatively limited. Bose
et al. craft adversarial examples by solving constrained op-
timization such that a face detector cannot detect a face [3].
In [32], perturbations are constrained to the eyeglass region
of the face and adversarial image is generated by gradient-
based methods. The adversarial eyeglasses can also be
synthesized via generative networks [33]. However, these
methods rely on white-box manipulations of face recogni-
tion models, which is impractical in real-world scenarios.
Dong et al. proposed an evolutionary optimization method
for generating adversarial faces in black-box settings [9].
However, they require at least 1,000 queries to the target
AFR system before a realistic adversarial face can be syn-
thesized. Song et al. employed a conditional variation au-
toencoder GAN for crafting adversarial face images in a
semi-whitebox setting [34]. However, they only focused
on impersonation attacks and require at least 5 images of
the target subject for training and inference. In contrast,
we train a GAN that can perform both obfuscation and im-
personation attacks and requires a single face image of the
target subject.
3. AdvFaces
Our goal is to synthesize a face image that visually ap-
pears to pertain to the target person, yet automatic face
recognition systems either incorrectly matches the synthe-
sized image to another person or does not match to gen-
uine person’s gallery images. Figure 5 outlines the proposed
framework.
AdvFaces comprises of a generator G, a discriminatorD,
and face matcher F (see Figure 5 and Algorithm 1).
Generator The proposed generator takes an input face
image, x ∈ X , and outputs an image, G(x). The genera-
tor is conditioned on the input image x; for different input
faces, we will get different synthesized images.
Since our goal is to obtain an adversarial image that is
metrically close to the original input image, x, we do not
wish to perturb all the pixels in the original image. For this
reason, we treat the output from the generator as an additive
mask and the adversarial face is x+G(x). If the magnitude
of the pixels in G(x) is minimal, then the adversarial image
comprises mostly of the probe x. Here, we denote G(x)
as an “adversarial mask”. In order to bound the magnitude
of the adversarial mask, we introduce a perturbation hinge
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Figure 5: Overview of the proposed adversarial generation method
in an obfuscation setting. Given a probe face image, AdvFaces
automatically generates an adversarial mask that is then added to
the probe to obtain an adversarial face image.
loss during training by minimizing the L2 norm3:
Lperturbation = Ex [max (, ‖G(x)‖2)] (1)
where  ∈ [0,∞) is a hyperparameter that controls the min-
imum amount of perturbation allowed.
In order to achieve our goal of impersonating a target
subject or obfuscating one’s own identity, we need a face
matcher, F , to supervise the training of AdvFaces. For ob-
fuscation attack, the goal is to generate an adversarial image
that does not match any of the subject’s gallery images. At
each training iteration, AdvFaces tries to minimize the co-
sine similarity between face embeddings of the input probe
x and the generated image x + G(x) via an identity loss
function:
Lidentity = Ex[F(x, x+ G(x))] (2)
For an impersonation attack, AdvFaces maximizes the co-
sine similarity between the face embeddings of a randomly
chosen target’s probe, y, and the generated adversarial face
x+ G(x) via:
Lidentity = Ex[1−F(y, x+ G(x))] (3)
The perturbation and identity loss functions enforce the
network to learn the salient facial regions that can be per-
turbed minimally in order to evade automatic face recogni-
tion systems.
Discriminator Akin to previous works on GANs [12, 17],
we introduce a discriminator in order to encourage per-
ceptual realism of the generated images. We use a fully-
convolution network as a patch-based discriminator [17].
Here, the discriminator, D, aims to distinguish between a
probe, x, and a generated adversarial face image x + G(x)
3For brevity, we denote Ex ≡ Ex∈X .
via a GAN loss:
LGAN = Ex [logD(x)] +
Ex[log(1−D(x+ G(x)))]
(4)
Finally, AdvFaces is trained in an end-to-end fashion
with the following objective:
L = LGAN + λiLidentity + λpLperturbation (5)
where λi and λp are hyper-parameters controlling the rel-
ative importance of identity and perturbation losses, re-
spectively. Note that LGAN and Lperturbation encourages
the generated images to be visually similar to the original
face images, while Lidentity optimizes for a high attack
success rate. We train AdvFaces as a minmax game via
{arg minGmaxDL}. After training, the generator G can gen-
erate an adversarial face image for any input image and can
be tested on any black-box face recognition system.
4. Experimental Results
Evaluation Metrics We quantify the effectiveness of the
adversarial attacks generated by AdvFaces and other state-
of-the-art baselines via (i) attack success rate and (ii) struc-
tural similarity (SSIM).
The attack success rate for obfuscation attack is com-
puted as,
Attack Success Rate =
(No. of Comparisons < τ )
Total No. of Comparisons
(6)
where each comparison consists of a subject’s adversarial
probe and an enrollment image. Here, τ is a pre-determined
threshold computed at, say, 0.1% FAR4. Attack success rate
for impersonation attack is defined as,
Attack Success Rate =
(No. of Comparisons ≥ τ )
Total No. of Comparisons
(7)
Here, a comparison comprises of an adversarial image syn-
thesized with a target’s probe and matched to the target’s
enrolled image. We evaluate the success rate for the im-
personation setting via 10-fold cross-validation where each
fold consists of a randomly chosen target.
Similar to prior studies [34], in order to measure the sim-
ilarity between the adversarial example and the input face,
we compute the structural similarity index (SSIM) between
the images. SSIM is a normalized metric between−1 (com-
pletely different image pairs) to 1 (identical image pairs):
SSIM(x, y)5 =
(2µxµy + c1)(2σxy + c2)
(µ2x + µ
2
y + c1)(σ
2
x + σ
2
y + c2)
(8)
4We compute the threshold at 0.1% FAR on all possible image pairs in
LFW. For e.g., threshold @ 0.1% FAR for ArcFace is 0.28.
5Here, x and y are the two images that are compared, µx, µy , σ2x,
σ2y , are the means and variances of x and y, respectively. The co-
variance of x and y is σxy . Parameters ci = (kiL)2, where L =(
2(# of bits per pixel) − 1), k1 = 0.01, k2 = 0.03 by default [40].
Obfuscation Attack AdvFaces GFLM [5] PGD [22] FGSM [13]
Attack Success Rate (%)
FaceNet [31] 99.67 23.34 99.70 99.96
SphereFace [20] 97.22 29.49 99.34 98.71
ArcFace [6] 64.53 03.43 33.25 35.30
COTS-A 82.98 08.89 18.74 32.48
COTS-B 60.71 05.05 01.49 18.75
Structural Similarity 0.95 ± 0.01 0.82 ± 0.12 0.29 ± 0.06 0.25 ± 0.06
Computation Time (s) 0.01 3.22 11.74 0.03
Impersonation Attack AdvFaces A3GN [34] PGD [22] FGSM [13]
Attack Success Rate (%)
FaceNet [31] 20.85 ± 0.40 05.99 ± 0.19 76.79 ± 0.26 13.04 ± 0.12
SphereFace [20] 20.19 ± 0.27 07.94 ± 0.19 09.03 ± 0.39 02.34 ± 0.03
ArcFace [6] 24.30 ± 0.44 17.14 ± 0.29 19.50 ± 1.95 08.34 ± 0.21
COTS-A 20.75 ± 0.35 15.01 ± 0.30 01.76 ± 0.10 01.40 ± 0.08
COTS-B 19.85 ± 0.28 10.23 ± 0.50 12.49 ± 0.24 04.67 ± 0.16
Structural Similarity 0.92 ± 0.02 0.69 ± 0.04 0.77 ± 0.04 0.48 ± 0.75
Computation Time (s) 0.01 0.04 11.74 0.03
Table 1: Attack success rates and structural similarities between probe and gallery images for obfuscation and impersonation attacks.
Attack rates for obfuscation comprises of 484,514 comparisons and the mean and standard deviation across 10-folds for impersonation
reported. The mean and standard deviation of the structural similarities between adversarial and probe images along with the time taken to
generate a single adversarial image (on a Quadro M6000 GPU) also reported.
Datasets We train AdvFaces on CASIA-WebFace [44]
and then test on LFW [16]6.
• CASIA-WebFace [44] comprises of 494,414 face im-
ages belonging to 10,575 different subjects.
• LFW [16] contains 13,233 web-collected images of
5,749 different subjects. In order to compute the at-
tack success rate, we only consider subjects with at
least two face images. After this filtering, 9,614 face
images of 1,680 subjects are available for evaluation.
Experimental Settings We use ADAM optimizers in
Tensorflow with β1 = 0.5 and β2 = 0.9 for the entire
network. Each mini-batch consists of 32 face images. We
train AdvFaces for 200,000 steps with a fixed learning rate
of 0.0001. Since our goal is to generate adversarial faces
with high success rate, the identity loss is of utmost impor-
tance. We empirically set λi = 10.0 and λp = 1.0. We
train two separate models and set  = 3.0 and  = 8.0
for obfuscation and impersonation attacks, respectively. All
experiments are conducted using Tensorflow r1.12.0 and a
NVIDIA Quadro M6000 GPU. Implementations are pro-
vided in Appendix A.
6Training on CASIA-WebFace and evaluating on LFW is a common
approach in face recognition literature [6, 20]
Face Recognition Systems For all our experiments, we
employ 5 state-of-the-art face matchers7. Three of them are
publicly available, namely, FaceNet [31], SphereFace [20],
and ArcFace [6]. We also report our results on two
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) face matchers, COTS-A
and COTS-B8. We use FaceNet [31] as the white-box face
recognition model, F , during training. All the testing im-
ages in this paper are generated from the same model
(trained only with FaceNet) and tested on different match-
ers.
4.1. Comparison with State-of-the-Art
In Table 1, we find that compared to the state-of-the-art,
AdvFaces generates adversarial faces that are similar to the
probe. Moreover, the adversarial images attain a high ob-
fuscation attack success rate on 4 state-of-the-art black-box
AFR systems in both obfuscation and impersonation set-
tings. AdvFaces learns to perturb the salient regions of the
face, unlike PGD [22], FGSM [13] which perturbs every
pixel in the image. Due to this, we find that, albeit high
success rate, the structural similarity between probes and
7All the open-source and COTS matchers achieve 99% accuracy on
LFW under LFW protocol.
8Both COTS-A and COTS-B utilize CNNs for face recognition.
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(a) Obfuscation Attack
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Figure 6: Adversarial face synthesis results on LFW dataset in (a) obfuscation and (b) impersonation attack settings (cosine similarity
scores obtained from ArcFace [6] with threshold @ 0.1% FAR= 0.28). The proposed method synthesizes adversarial faces that are
seemingly inconspicuous and maintain high perceptual quality.
Input w/o LGAN w/o Lprt w/o Lidt with all
Figure 7: Variants of AdvFaces trained without GAN loss, pertur-
bation loss, and identity loss, respectively.
synthesized faces for PGD and FGSM are low. GFLM [5],
on the other hand, geometrically warps the face images and
thereby, results in low structural similarity. In addition, the
state-of-the-art matchers are robust to such geometric de-
formation which explains the low success rate of GFLM on
face matchers. A3GN is also a GAN-based method, how-
ever, fails to achieve a reasonable success rate in an im-
personation setting. In Figure 6, we see that, in addition
to high success rate, adversarial faces generated by the pro-
posed method are visually appealing and the differences be-
tween probe and synthesized images are hardly distinguish-
able compared to the baselines.
Probe Adv. Mask Visualization Adv. Image
0.12
0.26
Figure 8: Pixels that have been perturbed (Column 3) to generate
the corresponding adversarial images for the given probes (Col-
umn 1). AdvFaces outputs adversarial masks (Column 2) which
are added to the probes to obtain adversarial images in the last
column. State-of-the-art face matchers can be evaded by slightly
perturbing salient facial regions, such as eyebrows, eyeballs, and
nose (cosine similarity obtained via ArcFace [6]).
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Figure 9: Trade-off between attack success rate and structural sim-
ilarity for impersonation attacks. We choose  = 8.0.
4.2. Ablation Study
In order to analyze the importance of each module in our
system, in Figure 7, we train three variants of AdvFaces
for comparison by removing the GAN loss (LGAN ), per-
turbation loss Lperturbation, and identity loss Lidentity, re-
spectively. The GAN loss helps to ensure the visual quality
of the synthesized faces are maintained. With the genera-
tor alone, undesirable artifacts are introduced. Without the
proposed perturbation loss, perturbations in the adversarial
mask are unbounded and therefore, leads to a lack in percep-
tual quality. The identity loss is imperative in ensuring an
adversarial image is obtained. Without the identity loss, the
synthesized image cannot evade state-of-the-art face match-
ers. We find that every component of AdvFaces is necessary
in order to obtain an adversarial face that is not only per-
ceptually realistic but can also evade state-of-the-art face
matchers.
4.3. What is AdvFaces Learning?
During training, AdvFaces learns to perturb the salient
facial regions that can evade the face matcher, F
(FaceNet [31] in our case). This is enforced by
Lperturbation which penalizes large perturbations and
thereby, restricts perturbations to only salient pixel loca-
tions. In Figure 8, AdvFaces synthesizes the adversarial
masks corresponding to the probes. We then threshold the
mask to extract pixels with perturbation magnitudes exceed-
ing 0.40. It can be inferred that the eyebrows, eyeballs, and
nose contain highly discriminative information that an AFR
system utilizes to identify an individual. Therefore, perturb-
ing these salient regions are enough to evade state-of-the-art
face recognition systems.
4.4. Effect of Perturbation Amount
The perturbation hinge loss, Lperturbation is bounded by
a hyper-parameter, . That is, the L2 norm of the adver-
sarial mask must be at least . Without this constraint, the
adversarial mask becomes an empty image with no changes
to the probe. With , we can observe a trade-off between
the attack success rate and the structural similarity between
the probe and synthesized adversarial face in Figure 9. A
higher  leads to less perturbation restriction. This generates
a higher attack success rate at the cost of a lower structural
similarity. For an impersonation attack, this implies that the
adversarial image may contain facial features from both the
hacker and the target. In our experiments, we chose  = 8.0
and  = 3.0 for impersonation and obfuscation attacks, re-
spectively.
5. Conclusions
We proposed a new method of adversarial face synthesis,
namely AdvFaces, that automatically generates adversarial
face images with imperceptible perturbations evading state-
of-the-art face matchers. With the help of a GAN, and the
proposed perturbation and identity losses, AdvFaces learns
the set of pixel locations required by face matchers for iden-
tification and only perturbs those salient facial regions (such
as eyebrows and nose). Once trained, AdvFaces generates
high quality and perceptually realistic adversarial examples
that are benign to the human eye but can evade state-of-the-
art black-box face matchers, outperforming other state-of-
the-art adversarial face methods.
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A. Implementation Details
AdvFaces is implemented using Tensorflow r1.12.0. A
single NVIDIA Quadro M6000 GPU is used for training
and testing.
Data Preprocessing All face images are passed through
MTCNN face detector [45] to detect five landmarks (two
eyes, nose, and two mouth corners). Via similarity transfor-
mation, the face images are aligned. After transformation,
the images are resized to 160 × 160. Before passing into
networks, each pixel in the RGB image is normalized by
subtracting 127.5 and dividing by 128.
Architecture Let c7s1-k be a 7× 7 convolutional layer
with k filters and stride 1. dk denotes a 4× 4 convolutional
layer with k filters and stride 2. Rk denotes a residual block
that contains two 3 × 3 convolutional layers. uk denotes
a 2× upsampling layer followed by a 5 × 5 convolutional
layer with k filters and stride 1. We apply Instance Nor-
malization and Batch Normalization to the generator and
discriminator, respectively. We use Leaky ReLU with slope
0.2 in the discriminator and ReLU activation in the genera-
tor. The architectures of the two modules are as follows:
• Generator:
c7s1-64,d128,d256,R256,R256,R256,
u128, u64, c7s1-3
• Discriminator:
d32,d64,d128,d256,d512
A 1 × 1 convolutional layer with 3 filters and stride 1 is
attached to the last convolutional layer of the discriminator
for the patch-based GAN loss LGAN .
We apply the tanh activation function on the last convo-
lution layer of the generator to ensure that the generated
image ∈ [−1, 1]. In the paper, we denoted the output of
the tanh layer as an “adversarial mask”, G(x) ∈ [−1, 1]
and x ∈ [−1, 1]. The final adversarial image is computed
as xadv = 2 × clamp
[G(x) + (x+12 )]10 − 1. This en-
sures G(x) can either add or subtract pixels from x when
G(x) 6= 0. When G(x)→ 0, then xadv → x.
The overall algorithm describing the training procedure
of AdvFaces can be found in Algorithm 1.
B. Structural Similarity
Image comparison techniques, such Mean Squared Er-
ror (MSE) or Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR), estimate
the absolute errors, disregarding the perceptual differences;
on the other hand, SSIM is a perception-based model that
considers image differences as perceived change in struc-
tural information, while also incorporating important per-
ceptual phenomena, including both luminance masking and
contrast masking terms. For instance, consider the image
pair comprising of two images of Ming Xi. We can notice
that perceptually, the image pairs are similar, but this per-
ceptual similarity is not reflected appropriately in MSE and
Algorithm 1 Training AdvFaces via Adam optimizers. All
experiments in this work use α = 0.0001, β1 = 0.5, β2 =
0.9, λi = 10.0, λp = 1.0, m = 32,  = 3.0, and  = 8.0 for
obfuscation and impersonation attacks, respectively.
1: Input
2: X Training Dataset
3: F Cosine similarity between an image pair ob-
tained by face matcher
4: G Generator with weights Gθ
5: D Discriminator with weights Dθ
6: m Batch size
7: α Learning rate
8: for number of training iterations do
9: Sample a batch of probes {x(i)}mi=1 ∼ X
10: if impersonation attack then
11: Sample a batch of target images y(i) ∼ X
12: δ(i) = G((x(i), y(i))
13: else if obfuscation attack then
14: δ(i) = G(x(i))
15: end if
16: x
(i)
adv = x
(i) + δ(i)
17: Lperturbation = 1m
[∑m
i=1 max
(
, ||δ(i)||2
)]
18: if impersonation attack then
19: Lidentity = 1m
[∑m
i=1 F
(
x(i), x
(i)
adv
)]
20: else if obfuscation attack then
21: Lidentity = 1m
[∑m
i=1
(
1−F
(
y(i), x
(i)
adv
))]
22: end if
23: LGGAN = 1m
[∑m
i=1 log
(
1−D(x(i)adv)
)]
24: LD = 1m
[∑m
i=1 log
(D(x(i)))+ log (1−D(x(i)adv))]
25: LG = LGGAN + λiLidentity + λpLperturbation
26: Gθ = Adam(OGLG ,Gθ, β1, β2)
27: Dθ = Adam(ODLD,Dθ, β1, β2)
28: end for
PSNR. Since, SSIM is a normalized similarity metric, it is
better suited for our application where a face image pair is
subjectively judged by human operators.
(a) Probe (b) Adversarial
SSIM: 00.96 MSE: 40.82 PSNR: 32.02
C. Effect on Cosine Similarity
In Figure 10, we see the effect on cosine similarity scores
when adversarial face images synthesized by AdvFaces is
introduced to a black-box face matcher, ArcFace [6]. A
majority (64.53%) of the scores fall below the threshold at
0.1% FAR causing the AFR system to falsely reject under
obfuscation attack. In the impersonation attack setting, the
system falsely accepts 24.30% of the image pairs.
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Figure 10: Shift in cosine similarity scores for ArcFace [6]
before and after adversarial attacks generated via AdvFaces.
D. Baseline Implementation Details
All the state-of-the-art baselines in the paper are imple-
mentations proposed specifically for evading face recogni-
tion systems.
FGSM [13] We use the Cleverhans implementation9 of
FGSM on FaceNet. This implementation supports both ob-
9https://github.com/tensorflow/cleverhans/tree/
master/examples/facenet_adversarial_faces
fuscation and impersonation attacks. The only modification
was changing  = 0.01 to  = 0.08 in order to create more
effective attacks.
PGD [22] We use a variant of PGD proposed specifically
for face recognition systems 10. Originally, this implemen-
tation is proposed for impersonation attacks, however, for
obfuscation we randomly choose a target other than genuine
subject. We do not make any modifications to the parame-
ters.
GFLM [5] Code for this landmark-based attack synthesis
method is publicly available 11. This method relies on soft-
max probalities implying that the training and testing identi-
ties are fixed. Originally, the classifier is trained on CASIA-
WebFace. However, for a fairer evaluation, we trained a
face classifier on LFW and then ran the attack.
A3GN [34] To the best of our knowledge, there is no pub-
licly available implementation of A3GN. Our implementa-
tion is included with our open-source code 12. We made the
following modifications to achieve an effective baseline:
• The authors originally used ArcFace [6] as the target
model. Since all other baselines employ FaceNet as the
target model, we also used FaceNet for training A3GN.
• Originally, a cycle-consistency loss was proposed for
content preservation. However, we were not able to
reproduce this and therefore, opted for the same L1
norm loss, but without the second generator. This
greatly helps in the visual quality of the generated ad-
versarial image. That is, we modified Equation 3 [34],
from Lrec = Ex,z [||x−G2(G1(x, z))||1] to Lrec =
Ex,z [||x−G1(x, z)||1]
10https://github.com/ppwwyyxx/
Adversarial-Face-Attack
11https://github.com/alldbi/FLM
12[Link omitted for blind review]
